Bloomberg you stupid commie FUCK!
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A Voice of Freedom
2013-06-19 23:12:55 UTC
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2013-06-28 00:26:11 UTC
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Post by A Voice of Freedom
Curt Anderson
Associated Press Writer

Bloomberg is one of the most despicable politicians who ever lived. He
wants to turn NYC, and the whole country if he can, into a nanny state
where the government not only strictly controls guns but the amount of
sugar people consume.

He has the police in New York randomly stopping and searching people,
often many times, to make a quota. He ignores the evidence that
background checks accomplish nothing and that the mentally ill are less
likely to be the perpetrators of violence. Like most demagogues, he
realizes that people can be swayed more easily by anecdotes.

A cop in New York became so fed up with the practice that he revealed
it to the local news. An audio tape was made in which the police
supervisor tells his staff they must produce a certain number of
arrests and stops.


Jim Hoffer
News Team NEW YORK (WABC) -- An Eyewitness News investigation talks to
a police officer who reveals the pressure they are under to make quotas.
"I'm not going to keep arresting innocent people, I'm not going to keep
searching people for no reason, I'm not going to keep writing people
for no reason, I'm tired of this," said Adil Polanco, an NYPD Officer.
Officer Polanco says One Police Plaza's obsession with keeping crime
stats down has gotten out of control. He claims Precinct Commanders
relentlessly pressure cops on the street to make more arrests, and give
out more summonses, all to show headquarters they have a tight grip on
their neighborhoods.
"Our primary job is not to help anybody, our primary job is not to
assist anybody, our primary job is to get those numbers and come back
with them?" said Officer Polanco.
"They have to meet a quota. One arrest and twenty summonses," said
Officer Polanco.

Curt Anderson
Associated Press Writer

Like most demagogues, he realizes that people can be swayed more easily
by anecdotes.

A cop in New York became so fed up with the practice that he revealed
it to the local news. An audio tape was made in which the police
supervisor tells his staff they must produce a certain number of
arrests and stops.


1. Among all crimes, the perpetrator is caught and convicted in only 1%
to 2% of all cases.
2. The police have no significant effect on the overall crime rate.
3. Many of those convicted and imprisoned are later proven innocent by
DNA or other definitive tests.
4. The police falsify and fabricate evidence to get a conviction in a
large percentage of cases.
5. The police manipulate the system to get overtime pay or pay for
being present unnecessarily.
6. The police frequently harass, beat, and even kill innocent people.
7. The police often arrest people to make arbitrary quotas

Malcolm C Young, Marc Mauer: "...ultimately, only about 2 percent of
violent crimes result in a conviction." ("Tougher Laws Will Not
Prevent Crime." In: _Crime_, P. Winters, ed. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven
Press, 1998)
Less than half (about 42%) of all murders are ever solved,
In one study, in only 11% of reported cases of sexual assault was
someone convicted (Gray-Eurom K, Seaberg DC, Wears RL: The prosecution
of sexual assault cases: Correlation with forensic evidence. Ann Emerg
Med 2002; 39:39-46.)

The police often quote their "clearance rate," i.e., the percentage of
crimes in which someone was arrested or they "cleared" from their books
for some other reason. Nationwide, by FBI figures, in the Nation in
2009, 47.1 percent of violent crimes and 18.6 percent of property
crimes were "cleared" by arrest or exceptional means Of the violent
crimes of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter 66.6%, forcible rape
41.2%, robbery 28.2%, burglary 12.5%, motor vehicle theft 12.4%,
aggravated assault 56.8%.

Even by the FBI's own figures, only about 25% of crimes are "cleared."
However, what they don't tell you is--

1. The clearance rate only refers to the percentage of reported crime
in which someone was arrested or they "cleared" from their books for
some other reason. It says nothing about whether the person was
actually guilty or, if guilty, there was enough evidence to convict.
2. The clearance rate is reported by the police departments themselves.
That's something like having a worker write his own job evaluation or
a student grade his own test. And in fact, investigations have found
that departments routinely inflate their clearance rates to make
themselves look good.
3. The clearance rate refers to the *reported* crimes cleared. Other
studies have found that less than half of all crimes are reported.

That means that the FBI-reported figure of a clearance rate of 62% for
murder translates into actually only about 40% of murders actually solved.
An extensive study published in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette found
hundreds of instances of police and prosecutors lying, hiding evidence,
distorting facts, engaging in cover-ups, paying for perjury, and
setting up innocent people in order to win indictments and convictions.
One former U.S. attorney, Robert Merkle, remarked, "It's a
results-oriented process today; fairness be damned. The philosophy of
the past 10 to 15 years [is] that whatever works is what's right."

People with a mental illness have become the latest target in the
government's assault. The fact is that the mentally ill, even those
serious ill, are rarely violent. They are far more likely to be the
victims than the perpetrators of violence. But anecdotes are a good
excuse to take away more freedom from everyone.
People With Mental Illness Target of New Gun Law
Rich Daly

Some psychiatrists fear that the law will further stigmatize people
with mental illness and divert attention away from the need for a
broader law that would result in a real reduction of gun-related violence.
Enhancing background surveillance of people with mental illness focuses
disproportionate resources on a population that commits only 3 percent
to 5 percent of gun violence, he said.
"They are lumping people who have received mental health care in with
criminals," said Steven Hoge, M.D., director of the Division of
Forensic Psychiatry at Bellevue Hospital Center in New York and a
member of APA's (American Psychiatric Association)Council on Psychiatry
and Law.
Hoge said that policymakers should focus their efforts on keeping guns
from those with characteristics conclusively linked to gun violence.
APA joined the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) in expressing
concerns about the vague and insulting terms for people with mental
illness in previously enacted gun-control legislation.
Although the protective impact of the law may be unclear, the impact on
the public's perception of people with mental illness is obvious to
"My concern is that this is one more brick in the wall of stigma
erected around people with mental illness," Appelbaum said.

"Featured in this video of a September 16, 2003 PowerTrac session are
Lt. Col. John Auer and Weston Chief Greg Page. Chief Page is being
commended by Auer for posting a 62.7% clearance rate. And, very
deserving of the praise Chief Page is. A 62.7% clearance rate is quite
remarkable. For comparison purposes, Fort Lauderdale police managed to
solve only 17.5% of their crimes in 2003.
When Auer asked Chief Page the secret to his success, the Chief gave
the credit to hard work and the leadership of criminal investigations
sergeant Mike Menghi. But, according to sworn statements given to the
Broward State Attorney by former Weston Detective Edwin Arias, a
subordinate of Menghi's, it appears that falsification of exceptional
clearances played a much bigger role in that 62.7% clearance rate than
did hard work. The essence of Arias’s statements was that Sgt. Menghi
taught him that falsification of exceptional clearances was standard
operating procedure at BSO."


There are three types of lies. Lies, Damn lies, and Statistics (Mark Twain)

"No way of measuring crime is perfect, and it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to know exactly how much crime is going
on in any jurisdiction at any time. First of all, crime is a label
slapped on some behaviors and not on others. There are known
inaccuracies in the labeling process. Secondly, much crime goes
undetected. Thirdly, some crimes are not reported to police. Crimes
that go undetected and unreported obviously cannot be counted.
Finally, the police themselves may, for various reasons, not record
something as a crime, or inaccurately report something as a crime when
it is not. Criminologists refer to all crime that escapes counting for
any of the above reasons as the dark figure of crime. Do we really
know how much crime is out there? Is what we really know only the tip
of the iceberg?

Here's an example of a typical police department's manipulation of
crime reporting. In 2004, Atlanta's own police chief ordered an audit
be carried out for crime reporting from previous years. The audit
found that the city police department had underreported crime for many
years in an attempt to boost the city's appeal to tourists and win the
site selection process for the 1996 Olympics. The audit was carried
out by the New York-based auditing firm Linder & Associates. It found
that in many cases (22,000), crime reports were simply lost because the
department was overworked, understaffed, and sloppy. However, in many
other cases, crime incidents were deliberately downgraded,
underreported, or discarded in order to make the city look good on
paper. The result of all this deliberate activity was that the crime
rate in Atlanta was reported as 7% lower than it should have been. The
standard FBI crime report margin of error is 2%. It may also be noted
that Atlanta has about 15 law enforcement agencies (university,
hospital, public transportation police, etc.) which do not send their
crime reports into either the Atlanta police or the FBI."


The police have little or no significant effect on the overall crime rate.
A number of studies by criminologists over many years have confirmed this.
"Over 30 years of criminological research has shown that the ability of
police to influence crime is extremely limited. For example, neither
the number of police in a community nor the style of policing appears
related to the crime rate. In 1991, San Diego and Dallas had about the
same ratio of police to population, yet twice as many crimes were
reported in Dallas. Meanwhile, Cleveland and San Diego had comparable
crime rates even though Cleveland had twice as many police officers per
capita. And in 1992, the District of Columbia had both the highest
homicide rate and the most metropolitan police per square foot of any
city in the nation......East St. Louis, one of the most economically
depressed cities in America, experienced a 60% decline in the homicide
rate over the same period...During that time no new police practices
were introduced. Rather, East St. Louis was so deep in debt that
police layoffs were common. Most police cars did not have functioning
two-way radios, and many remained idle due to lack of money for gas.
Nonetheless, proportionately the homicide rate declined more
dramatically in East St. Louis than it did in New York City.

The most thorough study ever done, a 1981 analysis of police beats in
Newark, NJ, found that foot patrols had virtually no effect on crime
--Richard Moran, professor of criminology at Mount Holyoke College.
"Community Policing Strategies Do Little to Prevent Crime." In: Crime
P. Winters, ed. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press.

David H. Bayley, Distinguished Professor of Criminal Justice, School of
Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany, had this to
say in several books and papers:
Police for the Future, Oxford University Press: New York 1994
"The police do not prevent crime (Ch 1)...Dishonest law
enforcement...is by and large what we have now. It occurs when the
police promise to prevent crime but actually provide something else -
namely, authoritative intervention and symbolic justice." (p. 124)
What Works in Policing by David H. Bayley (Editor). New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998.

A study of policing in Detroit from 1926 and 1977 found no relationship
between policing and crime rate (Ch 1)

Kansas City preventive patrol experiment


The Kansas City preventive patrol experiment was a landmark experiment
carried out between 1972 and 1973 by the Kansas City Police Department.
It was evaluated by the Police Foundation. It was designed to test the
assumption that the presence (or potential presence) of police officers
in marked cars reduced the likelihood of a crime being committed.

The design took three police beats in Kansas City, and varied patrol
routine in them. The first group received no routine patrols, instead
the police responded only to calls from residents. The second group had
the normal level of patrols, while the third had two to three times as
many patrols.

Victim surveys, reported crime rates, arrest data, a survey of local
businesses, attitudinal surveys, and trained observers who monitored
police-citizen interaction were used to gather data.

Major findings

1. Citizens did not notice the difference when the frequency of
patrols was changed.

2. Increasing or decreasing the level of patrol had no significant
effect on resident and commercial burglaries, auto thefts, larcenies
involving auto accessories, robberies, or vandalism-crimes.

3. The rate at which crimes were reported did not differ
significantly across the experimental beats.

4. Citizen reported fear of crime was not affected by different
levels of patrol.

5. Citizen satisfaction with police did not vary.


Police and Crime Rates

by Dr. Michael P. Riccards

Dr. Michael P. Riccards is Executive Director of the Hall Institute of
Public Policy – New Jersey. Riccards is a former college president and
a presidential scholar who has authored 15 books.

Friday, 03 December 2010 00:41

In their classic study of police behavior, New Blue Line by Jerome
Skolnick and David Bayley (1988), the authors found that:

1. Increasing the number of police does not necessarily reduce crime
rates or raise the proportion of crimes solved. Once a certain
threshold of coverage has been reached – presumably long since passed
in the United States – increments of money and personnel are no longer

2. Random motorized patrolling does not reduce crime nor improve
chances of catching suspects;

3. Two-person patrol cars are no more effective than one person cars
in reducing crime or catching criminals.

4. Saturation patrolling does reduce crime, but only temporarily;

5. Major crimes that are most frightening (murder, robbery,
burglary, rape, homicide ) are rarely encountered by police on patrol;

6. Improving response time to emergency calls has no effect on
making arrests, and

7. Crimes are not solved through criminal investigation conducted by
police departments but by some people identifying criminals.


In System Conflict Theory, it is argued that clearance rates cause the
police to focus on appearing to solve crimes (generating high clearance
rate scores) rather than actually solving crimes.
The encyclopedia of police science, Volume 1 By Jack R. Greene


One study found that in those cases that could be definitely resolved
by DNA testing, in about one fourth of the convictions the person was
actually innocent (See, for example, Actual Innocence by Dwyer, Scheck,
and Neufeld).

Tainting Evidence: Inside the Scandals at the FBI Crime Lab
by John F. Kelly and Phillip K. Wearne

Fred Salem Zain was a police forensic expert in West Virginia and Texas
for nearly 15 years. Hired as a chemist by West Virginia State police
crime lab in 1979, he testified as an expert in dozens of rape and
murder cases about tests he had never done and results he had never
obtained. Despite complaints, nothing was done. In 1989, Zain became
head of serology at the Bexar County Medical Examiner's office in San
Antonio. When asked to review Zain's work, the Dallas forensic
specialist I. C. Stone found rampant fraud and falsification. In one
case, Zain had testified about blood evidence when no blood had been
found; in other cases he reported performing tests his lab was
incapable of doing.

In another case--

"In Orange County, California, a police officer photocopied fingerprint
cards from suspects and then pressed the wet photocopy of the prints
onto the blank "lift" cards from armed robberies...In upstate New York,
state troopers resorted to planting fingerprints on evidence in tough
cases. The practice was discovered only when one of the troopers
applied for a job with the CIA and bragged about his craftiness. The
information was passed on to the FBI, which sat on it for about a year
before notifying state authorities. While the FBI dilly-dallied, more
people were framed."

In the cases of "bad science" being used in the conviction, it is not
the underlying science that is bad--The police forensics lab or
"experts" distorted or actually falsified the forensic findings to show
what they wanted. Their other main tactic is to threaten witnesses to
say what the police want or they will be prosecuted themselves.